![]()
ArticlesTURNING THE TABLE ON THE PLC IN SPINAL IMPLANT LITIGATION: A CALIFORNIA JURY SAYS "NO" TO LIABILITY By Stephen L. Hewitt, Esq. [Editor's Note: Stephen L. Hewitt was the trial attorney for the manufacturer in this case. He is the senior partner of Hewitt & Prout, with law offices in Los Angeles and Sacramento, Calif. He was educated at University of California, Santa Barbara receiving degrees in philosophy and law and society in 1978 with a juris doctorate from California Western School of Law in 1981. He was then admitted to the California Bar in 1982. He is a member of the State Bar of California, the U.S. District Court for the Northern and Central Districts, the Southern California Association of Defense Counsel and the Southern California Association of Hospital Risk Managers. He specializes in health care litigation, products liability and professional malpractice defense, having tried cases in these areas in both the federal and state courts. Responses to this commentary are welcome. Copyright by the authors.] The precedents which have emerged in mass tort litigation over the past several years have conditioned the plaintiffs bar to hungrily scan every new medical device for chinks in the proverbial armor, sometimes regardless of the therapeutic indications, safety or efficacy of the product. In chronicling the past national lawsuits which have aspired to vilify and obliterate various advances in medical technology, the Dalkon Shield, Norplant devices and breast implant cases come immediately to mind. Thinking ahead, no one can dispute that fen-phen and Redux are to be the future focus of profitable multidistrict litigation. Where there is medical or technologic advancement, and at least one human subject to cast in the role of damaged figurehead for the inevitable trials and errors that accompany all progress, we can be assured that "some" lawyers will always seek a way to capitalize (and cash in) on the controversy. Thus it came as no surprise to learn that a similar fate awaited those who endeavored to research and develop improved spinal fixation implant devices for the treatment of orthopedic patients suffering from chronic pain and instability of the spine. The onset of investigational, surgical trials to examine the safety and efficacy of these exciting new devices elicited an immediate corresponding response, in the form of lawsuits which began on one side of the country and quickly proliferated to the other, creating a morass of state and federal issues which have yet to be fully sorted out. The current group of trial lawyers ordained to prosecute spinal implant cases has benefited from the historical lessons learned in prior mass tort litigation. They have cultivated every possible liability theory at both the state and federal level, sued every physician, hospital and manufacturer even remotely connected with the devices, and they have directed a massive advertising campaign toward the growing alumni of spinal patients in an effort to recruit suitable victims to support their lawsuits. They have even amassed their brethren across the country into a distinctive cult known as the "PLC" (Plaintiffs' Legal Committee), in order to pool their collective resources, experience and evidence. The same time-honored themes which drove prior mass tort litigation involving medical products have been revisited in the current spinal implant device litigation: lack of informed consent, improper human experimentation, medical negligence and strict products liability. However, those now waging war against spinal fixation devices have added two relatively novel legal theories to their arsenal, with their obvious purpose being to construct a basis for punitive damages: physician-manufacturer conspiracy through off-label use, and intent to defraud the FDA. To understand why there is currently more emphasis on these issues than on the more traditional arguments concerning lack of informed consent and medical causation of harm, one need only examine the differences between the populations of "victims." In stark contrast to the unfortunate recipients of faulty contraceptives and leaky silicone breast implants, some of whom suffered from the use of the medical device in question, many of the current spinal implant litigants can offer no empirical evidence of harm from the device, other than perhaps a disappointing lack of improvement from their preoperative condition. It is indeed significant to note how many cases have been filed by plaintiffs who are, for all practical purposes, relatively uninjured but who have been talked into righteous indignation. In order to succeed with a clientele unable to boast that the device in question left them with heart-wrenching illnesses or grotesque injuries, spinal implant antagonists have been forced to devise a way to arouse the ire of the average American jury without the usual parade of grisly "Kodak moments" at trial. Thus evolved arguments targeting the alleged unethical and insidious conduct of the orthopedic surgeon and his partner-in-crime, the spinal fixation implant manufacturer. That a physician could intentionally dupe his unsuspecting patient into accepting an experimental device, merely to increase the value of his stock in the implant company, would surely devastate the average juror who places blind faith in his doctor. That a manufacturer would knowingly allow and privately encourage physicians to use its FDA approved devices in off-label, unapproved ways, for the purpose of circumventing FDA regulations and increasing its profits, would certainly incite even the most temperate fact finder to outrage. The new argument goes, if a jury can be trained to focus on these sexy, provocative issues at trial, then perhaps they will overlook the absence of a truly injured plaintiff. If they can be convinced that all medical progress is basically conceived from the avarice of physicians and inventors, and that no patient is capable of giving a truly informed consent to a new procedure in the presence of such conspirators, then they will surely award punitive damages, which will offset the lack of objective general and special damages that the plaintiff can prove at trial. To borrow a phrase, this type of thinking may seriously underestimate the intelligence of the average American jury. A recent jury trial we were involved in Ventura, Calif. offers a poignant illustration of how the plaintiff's counsel failed to ignite the jury's sensibilities, despite having had the benefit of full access to the PLC's vast reservoir of information, and the trial court's latitude in allowing plaintiff to present extensive FDA regulations and communication, which had routinely been excluded by other state trial courts. In Dolan v. Advanced Spine Fixation Systems, Inc. et. al., No. 150677, (Calif. Super., Ventura Co.), the plaintiff, Robert Dolan, was a Naval electrician in his mid-thirties who underwent a laminectomy and fusion at L4-5 which involved the insertion of a spinal fixation implant device. He later required removal of the hardware and sued the orthopedic surgeon and the manufacturer of the device for compensatory and punitive damages. FACTS On May 24, 1989 and February 19, 1990, plaintiff Robert Dolan, suffered injuries to his lower back while in the course and scope of his employment for the Navy at Port Hueneme Naval Base, Oxnard, Calif. He was first evaluated by board certified orthopedic surgeon Dr. Russell Nelson of the Channel Islands Orthopedic Group on June 14, 1989 for his lower back complaints. Mr. Dolan was diagnosed as having grade 1 to 2 spondylolisthesis of L5, and moderate to severe degenerative disc disease at L4/L5 and L5/S1. He initially underwent conservative treatment, which did not relieve his pain complaints. He therefore eventually underwent back surgery on August 20, 1990. The procedure involved an L4-S1 posterior spinal fusion using Selby 1 spinal instrumentation, manufactured by Advanced Spine Fixation Systems, Inc. He also underwent an L5 laminectomy with bilateral L5 nerve root decompression, and right posterior iliac crest bone grafting. The Selby 1 device had been approved by the FDA for marketing and distribution, and involved the placement of bone screws in the sacrum. However, during the Aug. 20, 1990 surgery, Dr. Nelson elected to modify the configuration of the device, placing the bone screws in the lumbar vertebrae at L4 and the sacrum along with the insertion of a cross-bracing rod. The resultant design was one similar to the Wiltse System, in investigational device, also manufactured by Advanced Spine, which had not been approved by the FDA for commercial distribution. (The Selby 1 kit contained various components which, if the surgeon was so inclined, could be used to configure the device into either a Selby 1 configuration or modify in into a Wiltse configuration.) Mr. Dolan claimed that, as a result of the surgery, his lower back complaints worsened. On March 23, 1992, he underwent a second surgery to explore the fusion and remove the spinal fixation instrumentation. In the operative report, it was noted that there was a solid fusion from L4 to S1. However, Mr. Dolan continued to have back problems after the second surgery and removal of the hardware. He was subsequently diagnosed with failed back syndrome. After a short course of pain management treatment at St. John's Regional Medical Center, he was referred to Dr. David Moll, who essentially allowed Mr. Dolan to become addicted to narcotics to control his pain, including morphine and methadone. As of the time of trial, Mr. Dolan was continuing to work at the Naval Base, maintaining a light duty status while taking a daily regimen of morphine and methadone. Mr. Dolan claimed that he now suffers from extreme lower back pain due to failed back syndrome caused by the implant surgery. He maintains that he can only work by using methadone and morphine. He further claimed that he required a bilateral mastectomy due to the enlargement of his breasts caused by the long-term use of narcotics. Dolan sought past and future medical expense of approximately $125,000, loss of earning capacity of approximately $350,000, general damages of $2.4 million, and punitive damages in the "millions." THE PLAINTIFF'S ATTACK The attorneys for plaintiff attempted to ignite the jury's sensibilities in this case by making the following contentions, which mirrored the PLC's manual on "How to prosecute a case against Advanced Spine."(1)
Banking on the jury's common sense and the belief that they want to see the advancement of medicine and science utilized in medical care and treatment, the defense contended that: (2)
The trial lasted 23 days. After deliberating for eight hours, the jury returned defense verdicts in favor of both defendants. As to defendant Dr. Nelson ---negligence: 10-2 and informed consent: 9-3. For defendant Advanced Spine---negligence: 10-2; fraud: 11-1; and negligence per se: 11-1. After speaking with the jurors, we think the Dolan jury rejected the suggestion by plaintiff (and the PLC) that he was an unwitting victim of unapproved human experimentation. The jury was also unwilling to subscribe to the PLC's notion that, because the physician held stock in the company that manufactured the device, he recommended the surgery for other than legitimate medical reasons. According to the jurors, they did not interpret the manufacturer's occasional lapses in regulatory compliance as a basis to assume a conspiracy to defraud the FDA; to the contrary, they seemed to feel that the FDA contributed to those lapses by its own internal, administrative deficiencies. Their verdict seemed to demonstrate a measure of public skepticism as to the FDA's proficiency in regulating drugs and medical devices. This is significant because it suggests that: juries still believe in medicine and science; they respect medical progress and, when it is explained to them, they understand and accept it; they are open to promotion of medical products which aid in the healing process; they want to see the performance of advanced surgical procedures by capable surgeons; and, they feel that the FDA may, at times, impede this process. Thus, in this case, the PLC's plan of targeting the unethical orthopedic surgeon and his partner-in-crime, the greedy and deceitful spinal implant manufacturer, was an unsuccessful tactic. For this verdict suggests that, even in the face of sexy and provocative issues, an intelligent jury will ultimately focus on the objective medical and factual evidence. In light of this, we submit that the PLC's philosophy for prosecuting spinal implant litigation may seriously underestimate common sense and values of the jury. ENDNOTES 1. The court permitted into evidence virtually every letter written by the FDA to Advanced Spine from 1986 onward including letters suggesting violations of the Federal Regulations. Plaintiff was allowed to use the letters as evidence of statutory violations in support of his negligence per se and punitive damage claims. 2. It is quite possible that had the defendant Dr. Nelson obtained a written consent which disclosed the investigational issues involving pedicle screws, or for that matter had the hospital obtained such a consent, this particular lawsuit may never have come to trial. © Copyright 1997 Mealey Publications, Inc., Wayne. PA.
|